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REFLECTION

Everything Is Contingent:
A Comment on
Bob Gordon's Taming the Past
Kunal M. Parker"
In the introduction to Taming the Past, Bob Gordon invokes a well-known
passage in Oliver Wendell Holmes's 1897 essay The Path of the Law in which
Holmes, likening law to a dragon, argues that history serves either to kill law
or to tame it.1 But how exactly does history do this?
Holmes's was a very specific understanding of history, one that was
increasingly gripping the imagination of late nineteenth and early twentieth
century Euro-American modernist thinkers and that was sharply different
from the foundational and teleological historical models that had hitherto
dominated the nineteenth century imagination. All these earlier modelswhether the Scottish Enlightenment's feudalism-to-commerce model; the
Whiggish model about the progress of liberty; Hegelian, Comtean, or Marxist
models; or the models of Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer-had linked past,
present and future according to some particular logic. In all these models,
history pointed somewhere. By contrast, the Holmesian modernist historical
model offered neither meaning nor direction: It served principally to tear
down the pretended suprahistorical foundations of phenomena by showing
that such phenomena had arisen in historical time. As Holmes showed in The
Common Law,2 modernist history could kill or tame the dragon that was law by
showing that law was "merely" historical and, hence, that the pretended
suprahistorical foundations of law, whether rationality, morality, logic, or
unchanging tradition, were spurious. 3 Once law's foundations were
* Professor of Law and Dean's Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law.
1. See ROBERT W. GORDON, Introduction to TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY
AND HISTORY IN LAW 4 (2017) (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,186-87 (1920)).
2. OW. HOLMESJR., THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
3. For a detailed exploration of this point, see Kunal Parker, The History of Experience. On

the HistoricalImagination of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., POLAR, Nov. 2003, at 60,60-64.
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dismantled, ground was cleared. Present and future could be rethought and
remade.
In Taming the Past, Gordon strikes a distinctly Holmesian modernist note:
Now that I see all these essays collected together, it occurs to me that in one way
or another they almost all make some version of the same point: that the
historicized past poses a perpetual threat to the legal rationalizations of the
present. Brought back to life, the past unsettles and destabilizes the stories we tell
4
about the law to make us feel comfortable with the way things are.

Thus, for Gordon, what he calls "the historicized past" serves to undermine our
reassuring accounts about law. This is done by showing that law is (to use
Gordon's preferred adjective) "contingent."5 For Gordon, contingency entails
the following: It shows that a particular law (or institution or practice or idea)
is the product of a momentary confluence of factors that have come together in
historical time; that matters could well have transpired differently at the
putative moment of that law's origin; that that law's meanings have changed in
and over historical time; and that that law therefore has no necessary hold over
us and leaves us free to plot alternative futures. 6
Thus far, it would appear, history for Gordon serves mainly to tame the
dragon of law. But the book's title is Taming the Past. As it turns out, history in
Gordon's oeuvre also serves to tame the dragon of the past, to render the past
itself contingent. In this regard, the dragon Gordon would tame is not the past
in itself, the res gestae of history, but rather the past that presents itself to us in
the form of foundational histories. Once again following the path charted by
Holmes, Gordon argues repeatedly that history undermines the altogether-tooneat narratives of progress or decline that have so often captivated American
progressive and conservative legal thinkers and allowed them to distinguish
law from "mere" politics. When done right, Gordon suggests, history renders
all such foundational narratives contingent.
Even as Gordon tames the dragons of law and foundational history, he
identifies other dragons for the taming. In two celebrated articles-Historicism
in Legal Scholarship7 and CriticalLegal Histories8-Gordon famously turns on the
dragon of society. Where post-World War II sociolegal scholars piously
insisted that law adapted to-and could therefore be understood in terms of-

4. GORDON, supra note 1, at 5.
5. See, e.g., id. at 8.
6. See id. at 7-11.
7. ROBERT W. GORDON, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, in TAMING THE PAST, supra note 1,
at 183.
8. ROBERT W. GORDON, CriticalLegal Histories, in TAMING THE PAST, supra note 1, at 220.
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society,9 Gordon insisted that society was itself constituted by law. It could
thus not serve as a stable ground outside law in terms of which law could be
measured or derive meaning. Insofar as law was contingent, to the extent it
constituted society, it rendered society contingent, too. Another dragon tamed.
Gordon leads us, then, into a particular kind of predicament: Everything is
contingent. What kind of place has Gordon brought us to? I tried to come up
with a metaphor for this place, and the first thing I came up with was an
iPhone screen where all icons wobble simultaneously (and where the phone
wobbles too). Perhaps the metaphor is infelicitous. But the questions remain.
What is it like to live in a world where everything wobbles, where everything
may be rethought and remade, where there is no stable refuge? How might we
compare this world to the ones Gordon urges us to abandon for it?
As Gordon recognizes repeatedly, Anglo-American lawyers were hardly
strangers to the use of history and, therefore, no strangers to the practice of
rendering particular objects-laws, practices, or institutions-contingent. Over
the centuries, Anglo-American lawyers regularly marked out this or that
object as the product of a particular moment in time that made it either a relic
of an outmoded past, a valid feature of the present, or a harbinger of the future.
Anglo-American lawyers typically performed these operations in terms of
foundational histories. For centuries, they also did so without shedding the idea
that law possessed its own ahistorical foundations, modalities, and temporalities.11 Closer to our own historical moment, working people, black people,
women, LGBTQ communities, immigrants, the indigent, and others have at
various points all made arguments about the contingency of this or that legal
object on the basis of an understanding of American history as a continuous
expansion of liberty and equality. Such arguments have often been
accompanied by faith in the special ahistorical foundations, modalities, and
temporalities of law. But for Gordon, such kinds of demonstration of
contingency are partial, insufficient, and in the final analysis unacceptable
because they rest upon the "wrong" kind of history, namely foundational
history.1 2 The examples I have provided would be earlier or later iterations of
what Gordon calls, in Critical Legal Histories, "evolutionary functionalism,"
which he characterizes as the idea that "the histories of certain advanced
Western societies, most notably the United States, describe an evolutionary

9. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 13-25 (1973); JAMES
WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNITED STATES 3-32 (1956).
10. See GORDON, supra note 8, at 261-67.
11. See generally KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,
1790-1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2011).
12. See ROBERT W. GORDON, Taming the Past Histories of Liberal Society in American Legal
Thought, in TAMING THE PAST, supra note 1, at 317, 356.
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development that is both natural (in the sense that some version of it will
happen in every society unless 'artificial' constraints force a deviation) and, on
the whole, progressive."13 "Evolutionary functionalism" is, of course, a dragon
Gordon tames.
In seeking to situate Gordon's preference for total contingency, I found
revealing the blurb before Critical Legal Histories, in which Gordon describes
the critical legal studies movement's disdain for incremental or partial legal
change:
[T]here was common agreement around the idea that the way law was taught in
American law schools, rationalized in legal scholarship, and deployed in legal
arguments and decision-making ... tended to contribute to the complacent idea
that the legal system in force was just about as efficient, just, and rational a system
as it could be ("false legitimation" we called this); and that it could not be reformed
except in minor ways without risking economic and political catastrophe ("false
necessity").14

Thus, those arguing for the contingency of only this or that object in terms of
some foundational narrative about law or history or society might be guilty of
arguing from false necessity. Only dwelling in total contingency-which
implies total transformation-overcomes this falsehood.
In this regard, I will make a few brief and interrelated observations.
First, it is not clear that those who render this or that particular object
contingent in terms of historical or legal foundations do something radically
different from those who think of everything as contingent. The demonstration of the contingency of this or that thing typically takes place against a
backdrop of things imagined as stable or provisionally held stable. In other
words, to return to my iPhone metaphor, although we know that all icons
wobble, we typically focus on just one icon at a time. Much contemporary legal
history scholarship of the kind Gordon applauds in the introduction shows
only that this or that particularobject is contingent, not that everything is. I
also suspect that many contemporary legal historians working hard to
demonstrate that this or that particular object is contingent are motivated,
whether or not explicitly, by precisely the progressive, foundational histories
Gordon warns us against.
Second, one might well ask what we lose when we give up on foundational
ideas of law, history, and society. Gordon has thought about this. In the essay
Taming the Past Histories of Liberal Society in American Legal Thought, Gordon
recognizes the power of foundational thinking in American history: "The core
legal story of liberal society as the gradual release of liberty from 'feudal'
restraints toward more personal liberty and political inclusion, has surely been
13. See GORDON, supra note 8, at 223, 225 (capitalization altered).
14. See id. at 220.
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an immensely powerful force for emancipation: ask Thurgood Marshall...."15
Nevertheless, Gordon repudiates this kind of foundational history on the
ground that it all too often "allow[s] us to fog over and forget the bad past, to
pretend that our abominations and errors never happened, or that if they did
6
that they are safely left behind, locked up in the dead past."1 But this is not
how I read the work of many scholars of, say, race in the United States (to say
nothing of Thurgood Marshall) who refuse to paper over anything even as
they hold out a vision of history as an unfolding of justice.
Third, I want to suggest that Gordon might not always read many AngloAmerican legal thinkers sympathetically. In essay after essay, he writes that
Anglo-American legal thinkers-whether in the eighteenth, nineteenth, or
twentieth centuries-were excessively wedded to the dragons of law,
foundational history, and society that he has tamed. According to Gordon, the
Holmesian modernist moment to which he is heir never really caught on. But
such an account slights the immense intellectual work of twentieth century
American legal thinkers (to say nothing of the equally complex efforts of those
in earlier periods), who struggled mightily with the task of reconstructing
ideas of law, history, and society in the aftermath of the modernist critique. I
will point to just one example, the post-World War II constitutional theorist
Alexander Bickel, who labored throughout his career with the problem of how
to defend an idea of law after the Holmesian critique. In his last book, The
Morality of Consent, Bickel wrote:
"I do not know what is true," said Holmes. "I do not know the meaning of the
universe." His biographer, Mark DeWolfe Howe, wondered whether our
stomachs were "strong enough to accept the bitter pill which Holmes tendered
us." They had better be. We had better recognize how much is human activity a
random confusion, and that there is no final validity to be claimed for our truths.
If we allow ourselves to be engulfed in moral certitudes we will march to selfdestruction from one Vietnam and one domestic revolution-sometimes
Marcusean and often not-to another. And yet we do need, individually and as a
society, some values, some belief in the foundations of our conduct, in order to
make life bearable. If these too are lies, they are, as Holmes's great contemporary,
7
Joseph Conrad, thought them, true lies; if illusions, then indispensable ones.1

After Holmes, Bickel argued, law needed to figure out how to be a "true
lie," something known to be a lie and nevertheless insisted upon as true. The
same goes for ideas of history and society that after the modernist critique have
both gone away and yet remain with us. How might one place Gordon's

critique of someone like Bickel as arguing from false necessity in conversation
with Bickel's response that he is holding onto a true lie?
15. GORDON, supranote 12, at 355.
16. See id. at 356.
17. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 77 (1975).
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To end, I suggest that Gordon's rigorous antifoundationalism-his insistence on showing that everything is contingent-does not recommend itself
because it is a superior politico-legal strategy. As Gordon himself recognizes, it
would be easy enough to show that foundational ideas of law, history, and
society have accomplished as much as, if not more than, antifoundational ones.
Nor should we imagine that antifoundationalism poses dangers less grave than
those posed by foundationalism. So what do we do with Gordon's embrace of
antifoundationalism, with his career-long celebration of the contingent, with
his endorsement of total contingency? If Gordon's antifoundationalism cannot
point to its own superiority as an instrument, it can certainly gesture to itselfperhaps only gesture to itself-as an aesthetic. In the world Gordon constructs
in his brilliant synthetic essays, we encounter the deep pleasure he derives
from dwelling in contingency, from destabilizing and unsettling, from
stripping himself (and us) of our comforting stories about law, history, and
society. In its iconoclasm, his is a distinctly modernist pleasure, the pleasure of
discomfort, and, as such, one that is hard to argue with.
I note a final paradox. Gordon passes into contingency through the act of
taming, a word conveying docility, management, and control rather than the
wildness and exhilaration that contingency supposedly entails. It makes sense,
then, that Gordon chooses for the cover of his book a deeply religious image,
that of St. George slaying the dragon, of the good vanquishing the bad.
Antifoundationalism frequently turns to foundationalism to produce its
aesthetic effects. Is this Gordon's "true lie"?
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